We present zero-knowledge proofs and arguments for arithmetic circuits overnite prime elds, namely given a circuit, show in zero-knowledge that inputs can be selected leading to a given output. For a eld GF (q), where q is an n-bit prime, a circuit of size O(n), and error probability 2 ?n , our protocols require communication of O(n 2 ) bits. This is the same worst-cast complexity as the trivial (non zero-knowledge) interactive proof where the prover just reveals the input values. If the circuit involves n multiplications, the best previously known methods would in general require communication of (n 3 log n) bits. Variations of the technique behind these protocols lead to other interesting applications. We rst look at the Boolean Circuit Satis ability problem and give zeroknowledge proofs and arguments for a circuit of size n and error probability 2 ?n in which there is an interactive preprocessing phase requiring communication of O(n 2 ) bits. In this phase, the statement to be proved later need not be known. Later the prover can non-interactively prove any circuit he wants, i.e. by sending only one message, of size O(n) bits.
Introduction
Zero-Knowledge interactive proofs 17] and arguments 5] allow a prover to convince a veri er that a statement (on membership in a language) is true while revealing nothing but the validity of the assertion.
Interactive proofs are secure against cheating even by in nitely powerful provers, on the other hand, zero-knowledge can -at least for NP-hard problems -only be guaranteed relative to a computational assumption (unless the polynomial time hierachy collapses, 13]). The rst zero-knowledge interactive proof for an NPhard problem was given in 16], this was later extended to build zero-knowledge proofs for all languages in IP 6] , the class of languages with interactive proofs 3 .
Interactive arguments are only secure against polynomial time provers, and so require computational assumptions to establish soundness. On the other hand, they can provide perfect (unconditional) zero-knowledge for all of NP, as shown in 5] .
Summarizing informally, these basic results say that, under reasonable computational assumptions, all languages that have an interactive proof (argument), also have a zero-knowledge interactive proof (argument), albeit a much less ecient one. From this has emerged naturally a line of research aimed at improving the e ciency (in terms of communication complexity) of zero-knowledge protocols for NP complete problems such as SAT 4, 18, 19, 9] . It is natural to ask to what extent we can reach the optimal situation, where giving a zero-knowledge interactive proof for SAT, or other problems in IP, is as e cient as giving a mere interactive proof, in other words, can zero-knowledge be for free? In this paper we give protocols showing that in some cases, zero-knowledge may indeed be almost or entirely for free.
We rst present zero-knowledge proofs and arguments for arithmetic circuits over nite prime elds, namely given a circuit with multiplication and addition gates, show in zero-knowledge that inputs can be selected leading to a given output. We will refer to this as the arithmetic circuit problem. For a eld GF(q), where q is an n-bit prime, a circuit of size O(n), cryptographic security parameter n and error probability 2 ?n , our protocols require communication of O(n 2 ) bits. For interactive proof systems capable of handling any arithmetic circuit, we believe this is an optimal result: the simplest non-zero knowledge proof system would be to just reveal the inputs, which may cost (n 2 ) bits.
If the circuit involves n multiplications, the best previously known method is to rewrite the multiplications to Boolean circuits and use the best known protocol for circuit satis ability. This leads to a communication complexity of (n 3 log n) bits. As a more precise account of the performance of our protocol, we mention that its communication complexity is O((m+t)(l +n)dk=ne) bits where the error probability is 2 ?k , l is the cryptographic security parameter, m is the number of inputs and t is the number of multiplication gates. Thus linear operations are essentially for free. So for arithmetic circuits, it seems the only price we must pay for zero-knowledge is the interaction required. For an NP hard problem, this cannot be avoided unless NP BPP. But we can partially avoid it by going to the model of noninteractive proofs or arguments with preprocessing 25] . In this model, we present protocols for the Arithmetic Circuit Problem and Boolean Circuit Satis ability. Here, the prover and veri er are allowed to do an interactive preprocessing stage, in which it is not necessary to know which statement (circuit) will be proved later (except perhaps for an upper bound on its size). Then, at a later time, the prover should be able to prove any circuit of his choice by sending only one message.
For the arithmetic circuit problem, the complexity of both our preprocessing and proof phase is O(n 2 ) bits (the same as for the interactive protocol mentioned above).
For the Boolean circuit satis ability problem using a circuit of size n, cryptographic security parameter n and error probability 2 ?n , our preprocessing has size O(n 2 ) bits, whereas the proof is of size O(n) bits. Thus the proof stage has the same worst case complexity as the obvious interactive proof for SAT, where one just sends a satisfying assignment, which can in general have size (n). Since it is not known how to make do with less than this for an interactive proof for SAT and given that the interaction (in the preprocessing) cannot be avoided unless NP BPP, our result seems close to optimal. We also note that our total communication complexity is the same as that of the best previously known zeroknowledge interactive proofs 9] (which could not be split in a preprocessing and proof phase).
To compare with earlier work on interactive arguments, we need to give a more precise account of the performance of our protocols: for an error probability of 2 ?k , and cryptographic security parameter l, the complexity of the preprocessing is O(n)max(k; l) bits in the proof case, and O(ln + k) bits in the argument case. The proof phase has size O(n + l) bits in both cases. The best earlier work on arguments is by Cramer and Damg ard 9] who obtained O(n)max(l; k), and by Kilian 19] who obtained O(kl log l). None of these protocol could be split in a preprocessing and proof phase, as ours. Our total complexity improves on 9] and is not directly comparable to 19] . It is superior to 19] for some choices of parameters, e.g. when all parameters are chosen equal to n, but inferior in other cases -in particular because of the very interesting fact that the result from 19] does not depend on n.
From a practical point of view, Kilian's results are not of much relevance, since they are based on PCP's 2], and hence rely on the elaborate reductions needed to build PCP's. By contrast, the constants involved in our asymptotic complexities are small enough for our protocols to be practical with realistic choices of parameters. For example, our most e cient argument for SAT based on RSA produces a proof stage of size 2(n + l) bits, where l is the length of the RSA modulus used. Moreover, we believe that non-interactive protocols with preprocessing and small proofs have signi cant advantages over ordinary interactive protocols: In real networks, it is often the case that large amounts of bandwidth is available at low prices during particular time intervals, typically at times where the network operator expects tra c to be low. The preprocessing can then be done at such times, which makes the added cost of later doing a proof almost negligible: the prover must in any case send a message describing the circuit he wants to prove satis able, and appending our proof makes this message larger by only a constant factor.
Our nal result shows that Shamirs (Shens) 23, 24] interactive proof system for the (IP-complete) QBF problem can be transformed to a zero-knowledge proof system with the same asymptotic communication and round complexity 4 . Thus for QBF, zero-knowledge may in fact be entirely for free.
The security of our protocols can be based on any one-way group homomorphism with a particular set of properties. We give examples of special assumptions su cient for this, including: the RSA assumption, hardness of discrete log in a prime order group, and polynomial security of Di e-Hellman encryption. Our main technical tool is a method for building from the homomorphisms assumed a commitment scheme, where commitments can contain elements from a nite prime eld, and where multiplication and comparison of committed values can be handled very e ciently.
Protocol Descriptions
Our basic protocols make use of a commitment scheme for numbers modulo q, for some prime q. This section describes these protocols in a way that is independent from any particular implementation of the commitment scheme. We will describe how to build honest veri er zero-knowledge protocols. Standard techniques may then be used to make protocols that are zero-knowledge in general.
Notation and Properties for Commitments
For now, the reader may think of the commitment scheme intuitively as follows: the prover P puts an integer a into a closed box, where 0 a < q for some xed prime q and gives it to the veri er V . At this point, V cannot open the box, and P cannot change his mind about a. However, P may later choose to open a box and reveal the contents to V . More details on commitments can be found in Section 3.
In a real implementation, commitments will be represented by bit strings. We will use l to denote the length of a commitment, and we will assume that to open a commitment, it su ces to send, in addition to the value revealed, a string of length at most l bits.
We will need the following properties:
1. From commitment A containing a, resp. B containing b, V can on his own compute a commitment containing a+b mod q, or he may choose to compute one containing a ? b mod q. Since in our concrete examples, commitments are in a multiplicative group, we will denote these commitments by A B, resp. AB ?1 . The property also implies that V can multiply or add constants into a commitment. We will let A c ; cA; cA ?1 denote commitments to ca; c+ a; c ? a mod q, as computed from A.
2. There is a protocol by which P can convince V in honest veri er zeroknowledge that a given commitment is a bit commitment, i.e. P knows how to open it to reveal 0 or 1. 3. There is a protocol by which P can convince V in honest veri er zeroknowledge that he knows how to open a set of given commitments A; B; C to reveal values a; b; c, for which c = ab mod q. In particular, this means that P can show that he knows how to open a single commitment A (by choosing C = A and B a default commitment to 1).
In some implementations of commitments, q can be chosen independently of l, we then talk about commitments with unbounded q. In other implementations, q must be 2 O(l) . In such cases with bounded q, we will assume that q = 2 l , for some constant > 0.
Property 1 above may be used to show relations on committed bits. Concretely, suppose we want to show for two sets of bit-commitments D 0 ; :::; D n and C 0 ; :::; C n , where n < log q, that the same bit b i is contained in C i and D i , for i = 1:::n. This can be done much more e ciently than by comparing each C i ; D i individually. For this, we have the following protocol: EQUALITY PROTOCOL 1. the veri er rst computes the commitments C = C 2 n n C 2 n?1 n?1 :: C 0 , and D = D 2 n n D 2 n?1 n?1 :: D 0 which should both be commitments to the number whose binary representation is b n b n?1 :::b 0 . 2. Finally prover and veri er compute CD ?1 and the prover opens the result to reveal 0.
It is easy to see that this game reveals nothing about the value of b 0 ; ::b n , and that if P can open each of the commitments to reveal a one-bit value, all pairs C i ; D i contain the same bit, or he can break the commitment scheme. (q) In this section, we are given an arithmetic circuit over GF(q), where q is an n-bit prime, containing gates G 1 ; ::; G v , where we assume that G v is the gate computing the nal output from the circuit. We assume for simplicity that there is only one output value computed, we are given a value y for this output, and the prover's goal is to demonstrate that inputs can be selected that lead to output y.
Protocols for Arithmetic Circuits over GF
All gates have fan-in at most two and arbitrary fan-out. Gates may be multiplication gates, addition gates, and addition or multiplication by a constant.
The protocol takes place in a series of steps: STEP 0 The prover and veri er go through the setup phase for the commitment scheme, as described in Section 3. This can be done once and for all, and the instance of the commitment scheme generated can be reused in several protocol executions.
STEP 1
The prover makes m commitments I 1 ; ::; I m , such that I j contains input value x j 2 GF(q). The input values are selected such that the circuit computes y as output. The prover also makes t commitments T 1 ; :::; T t , such that T i contains the value that is output by the i'th multiplication gate in the circuit, given that the inputs are x 1 ; :::; x m . All commitments produced are sent to V , and P proves that he knows how to open all of them (using the third assumed property of commitments). STEP 2 Both P and V compute, based on I 1 ; ::; I m ; T 1 ; ::; T t and using the rst assumed property of commitments, for each gate commitment(s) representing its input value(s), and a commitment representing its output value. PROOF, Step 3 For each multiplication gate, do the following: let A; B be the commitments representing the input values a; b, and let C be the commitment representing the output value c. P uses the third property of commitments to convince V that ab mod q = c. PROOF, Step 4 P opens the commitment representing the output value of G v .
V accepts, if and only if all proofs in Steps 1 and 3 are accepted, and P correctly opens the commitment in Step 4 to reveal y.
The following is immediate from inspection of the protocol description:
Lemma 2.1 If inputs for can be selected leading to output y and P follows the protocol, then V always accepts. The communication complexity of the protocol is (m + t + 1)l + (m; t; l; k; n) bits, where (m; t; l; k; n) is the communication complexity for doing all the interactive proofs required in Steps 1 and 3.
A Non-interactive with Preprocessing Variant
We sketch here a variant of the arithmetic circuit protocol that is non-interactive with preprocessing. The asymtotic complexity for the preprocessing is the same as the original protocol, whereas the proof phase has complexity O((m+t)(l+n)) bits. The variant is based on a technique borrowed from Beaver et al. 1].
In the preprocessing, the prover will produce commitments J 1 ; :::; J m containing random values, and t triples of commitments of form D; E; F containing random 7 values d; e; f such that de = f mod q. The prover will show that he can open all commitments and that the multiplicative relations hold. In the proof phase, a circuit with input values is known to the prover. Consider a xed multiplication gate. It is rst assigned a distinct triple D; E; F from the preprocessing. Let a; b; c, where ab = c mod q be the values actually occurring at the gate. The prover can now send to the veri er = a ? d and = b ? e. Now, the veri er can on his own compute a triple A; B; C containing a; b; c by letting A = D, B = E and C = F D E .
In the same way, the prover tells the veri er how to modify the J i 's to get commitments containing the correct inputs to the circuit by giving the di erences between the random values in the J i 's and the actual values.
All that remains is for the prover to show that \gates connect correctly", i.e. that if e.g. A 0 represents the output from one gate, which is connected to the input of another gate, represented by A, the prover shows that A and A 0 contain the same value by opening A 0 A ?1 as 0.
Non-Interactive Protocols with Preprocessing for SAT
For the protocol description, we rst need some notation and de nitions: We will assume (without loss of generality) that the circuit to be proved satis able later is given with at most n NAND gates with fan-in 2 and arbitrary fan-out. In the following the honest prover will make only useful NAND-tables, but to keep the prover from cheating it will be enough to force him to generate at least correct NAND-tables.
De nition 2.2 A NAND-
To show correctness of a NAND-table, P can rst show that the 8 commitments in the two rst positions of each row are bit commitments, by the second assumption on commitments. Then for each row A; B; C, containing a; b; c, P uses properties 1 and 3 above to show that 1 ? c = ab mod q. Assuming that a and b are 0/1 values, this ensures that so is c, and that :c = a^b.
We are now ready to start giving the protocol in detail. First is: STEP 0 The prover and veri er go through the setup phase for the commitment scheme, 8 as described in Section 3. This can be done once and for all, and the instance of the commitment scheme generated can be reused in several protocol executions. PREPROCESSING The prover makes n useful NAND-tables, using for each table an independently and uniformly chosen permutation of the rows. He proves that all NAND-tables are correct, as described above.
For the proof phase, we are given the concrete circuit that should be shown to be satis able, containing gates G 1 ; ::; G n , where we assume that G n is the gate computing the nal output from the circuit. The proof string to be sent to V is constructed by P as follows: PROOF, Step 1 For i = 1::n, take the rst unused NAND table T i from the preprocessing and assign it to gate G i . PROOF, Step 2 Fix a set of input bits that satisfy the circuit. For each i = 1:::m, P selects a row in T i such that this row contains the 2 input bits and the output bit of G i in a computation on the satisfying input. P includes 2 bits in the proof string indicating which row is selected.
By selecting rows in all truth tables, P has essentially de ned a computation in the circuit. He must now show that this computation is consistent, by demonstrating that the output from one gate equals the input to another gate, if a wire connects them, and also that if the same input bit is used in several gates, the same value for this bit is consistently used. PROOF, Step 3 Consider any wire W in the circuit. We will associate a pair of commitments to W as described in the algorithm below. If W connects an input bit to a gate in the circuit, we will, for convenience in the description of the algorithm, associate a commitment Y W to W. This commitment is de ned during execution of the algorithm.
Suppose W connects the output of G i to the u'th input of G j , where u = 1 or 2. Let C be the last commitment in the selected row of T i (representing the output bit from G i ) and let X be the u'th commitment in the selected row of T j . Associate to W the pair C; X. 9
Suppose W connects input bit y to input number u of gate G i (u = 1 or 2), and let A be the u'th commitment in the selcted row of T i . If the commitment Y W has not been de ned yet, let Y W = A. Associate to W the pair Y W ; A. For all wires, P must now show that the associated pair of commitments contain the same bit. Clearly, this gives at most 2n pairs of commitments that must checked for equality. For commitments with unbounded q, or bounded commitments where l 2n, P completes these equality proofs by opening only one commitment, by running the Equality protocol shown above. Otherwise, the bits to be compared are distributed over several commitments holding l bits each, so P will need to open 2n=( l) commitments. PROOF, Step 4 P opens the last commitment in the selected row of T n (to reveal 1, in order to convince V about the nal result of the computation in the circuit). VERIFICATION OF PROOF If V rejected any of the proofs in the preprocessing, V rejects immediately. V selects the rows designated by the information from Step 2 of the proof. V computes the pairs of commitments used by P in Step 3, and veri es that P have proved that all pairs contain equal bits (this amounts to verifying that P has correctly opened one or more commitments to reveal 0). Finally V veri es that the commitment opened in Step 4 was correctly opened to reveal 1.
Lemma 2.3 If is satis able and P follows the protocol, then V always accepts.
The communication complexity of the protocol is for the preprocessing 12ln + (n; l; k) bits, where (n; l; k) is the communication complexity for doing all the interactive proofs required in the preprocessing; and for the proof phase 2(n + l) or (2 + 2= )n + l bits.
An Alternative Approach Based on Span Programs
The contents of this section can be found in Appendix A 2.5 Zero-Knowledge Proof for QBF
In 23], Shamir gave the rst proof that IP = PSPACE, by exhibiting an interactive proof system for the PSPACE complete QBF problem. A little later, Shen 24] , building on Shamirs ideas, gave a somewhat more e cient proof system for QBF, which appears to be the most e cient proof system known for QBF.
In this section, we sketch how our techniques may be applied to transform Shens proof system into a zero-knowledge proof system with the essentially the same communication and round complexity.
By examining Shen's protocol, one nds that all the work done takes place in a nite eld GF(q) for some prime q. If, for a QBF instance of length n, we want error probability negligible in n, say 2 ?n , the analysis of the protocol shows that this can be done by using a q of bit length O(n).
By further inspection of the protocol, one nds that in each round of the protocol, the prover sends the coe cients of some polynomial, the veri er checks this polynomial, and returns a random element in the eld. The operations done by the veri er in order to check the polynomials received all fall in one of the following categories:
1. Evaluate a polynomial received from the prover in a point chosen by the veri er, or in a constant point.
Add or multiply a constant number of values computed as in 1). 3. Compare values computed as in 1) or 2). 4. The nal step: insert all random values chosen by the veri er into a mul-
tivariate polynomial e ciently computable from the input QBF instance.
Compare the result to a value obtained from the previous rounds.
Our proposed modi cation of the protocol now simply consists of having the prover communicate his polynomials by in stead sending commitments to each of the coe cients.
By our assumptions on commitments, it is clear that this a ects the number of bits needed to send a polynomial by at most a constant factor, and furthermore that the veri er can on his own compute commitments to results of operations of type 1. For the multiplications in 2), the prover supplies a commitment containing the result of each such multiplication. Therefore, at the end of the interaction, the veri er has for each multiplication in the original protocol a set of triples of commitments (A; B; C) containing values (a; b; c), also he has one commitment D together with a value d that can be computed e ciently from the QBF instance. The veri er now only needs to be convinced that for each triple, it holds that ab mod p = c, and that D contains d. From our assumptions on commitments, it follows directly that the prover can convince the veri er about these facts in honest veri er zero-knowledge. Standard techniques can then be used to build a zero-knowledge protocol.
As can be seen from the following, the multiplication protocol we have is constant round and communicates a constant number of commitments. We therefore get a protocol with the same round and communication complexity, up to a constant factor.
Intuitively, this new protocol is zero-knowledge, because the verifer never sees any of the values chosen by the prover, only computationally useless commitments to them. Soundness is preserved, because the prover must, even in the transformed protocol, decide on the polynomial to send in a given round, before he sees the random eld element chosen by the veri er in that round. A more precise statement of our result follows in Section 4.
Commitment Schemes Based on Group Homomorphisms
A commitment scheme of the kind we use consists of a function commit : f0; 1g l 0::q ! f0; 1g l , whose description is output by a probabilistic polynomial time generator on input 1 l and a prime q, where l is a security parameter. This is done in the set-up phase of the commitment scheme. The generator may be able to take an arbitrary prime q as input. This is called a generator with unbounded q. Or there may be a constant > 0, such that the generator works, only if q = 2 l . This corresponds to the de nition in Section 2.1.
We refer to commit as the public key of the commitment scheme. To commit to an integer a 2 0::q , one chooses r at random from f0; 1g l and computes the commitment C as C commit(r; a). The value r masks a. To open a commitment, r; a are revealed, and the veri er veri es that commit(r; a) = C. For interactive proofs, we will need commitments to be unconditionally binding. This means that a is uniquely determined from commit(r; a). Of course we also need the scheme to hide a, but the best we can get in this case is that it is computationally hiding: the distributions of commitments to any pair of distinct integers are polynomially indistinguishable. For interactive arguments, we will use commitment schemes with dual properties: unconditionally hiding. This means that the a commitment to a has distribution independent of a. Then, with respect to the binding property, the best we can achieve is that the scheme is computationally binding. This means that, given the public key, no probabilistic polynomial time algorithm can compute a com-mitment and open it in two distinct ways, except with negligible probability.
Basic De nitions
To show how we build commitment schemes of the kind we need, we start with some notation and de nitions:
De nition 3.1 A Group Homomorphism Generator G is a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm which on input 1 l outputs a description of two nite Abelian groups G; H and a homomorphism f : H ! G. Elements in G; H can be represented as l-bit strings, and the group operation and inverses in G and H can be computed in polynomial time. Finally, a uniformly chosen element in H can be selected in probabilistic polynomial time.
De nition 3.2 A group homomorphism generator G is said to be one-way if the following holds for any polynomial size family of circuits f i j i = 1; 2; ::g: on input f; y, where f is selected by G on input 1 l and y is uniformly chosen in Im(f), the probability that l outputs x 2 H such that f(x) = y is superpolynomially small (in l).
We will need a further property of the generator, which loosely speaking says that f is as hard to invert in points of form y i as it is to invert it in y, as long as 0 < i < q, but inversion is easy in points of form y q :
De nition 3.3 A group homomorphism generator G is said to be q-one-way if it is one-way, takes a prime q as additional input, and there is a polynomial time algorithm satisfying the following: on input f; z; y; i where 0 < i < q, y 2 G, f(z) = y i , it computes x such that f(x) = y. Finally, there is a polynomial time algorithm which on input y computes x 0 such that f(x 0 ) = y q .
We remark that if f is one-one, and jHj = q, q-one-wayness follows trivially from one-wayness.
We are now ready to de ne the two kinds of generators that will enable us to make the bit commitment schemes we need:
De nition 3.4 An unconditionally hiding q-homomorphism generator G is a qone-way generator (even though this is the same as the previous de nition, we have chosen to give it a separate name, for uniformity with De nition 3.5).
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De nition 3.5 An unconditionally binding q-homomorphism generator G is a q-one-way generator, which also satis es that for f generated by G, there exists y 2 G, such that yIm(f) has order q in the factor group G=Im(f). Furthermore, the distributions y i f(r) and y j f(s) for 0 i; j < q, i 6 = j and independently chosen uniform r; s, must be polynomially indistinguishable.
Informally, what this de nition says, is that a y should exist, such that the cosets yIm(f); y 2 Im(f); :: are all distinct, and it should be hard to tell the di erence between random elements in distinct cosets.
Commiment Schemes
We are now ready to describe the two types of commitment schemes we have. Throughout, we will assume that a prover P will be generating commitments and sending them to a veri er V . First is an unconditionally hiding scheme:
Set-up Phase: V runs unconditionally hiding q-homomorphism generator G on input 1 l , to obtain f : H ! G. He chooses a random element y 2 Im(f), e.g. by choosing an element in H and applying f. Then f; G; H; y are sent to P. V must now give an interactive proof of knowledge that he knows an f-preimage of y. This proof can be easily constructed from the fpreimage protocol in Section 3.3, by using one-bit challenges, and iterating the protocol sequentially.
Commitment to integer 0 a < q: P chooses random r 2 H, and sends commit(r; a) = y a f(r) to V .
Opening commitment C: P sends a; r to V who accepts if and only if C = commit(r; a) and 0 a < q.
Hiding Property: is clear, since if P has accepted the set-up phase, it follows that (except with exponentially small probability) a commitment will have distribution independent from the value committed to, namely the uniform distribution over Im(f).
Binding Property: If any cheating prover P can open a commitment to reveal two di erent values, he can produce a; r; a 0 ; r 0 such that a 6 = a 0 and y a f(r) = y a 0 f(r 0 ). Assume without loss of generality that a > a 0 . Then y a?a 0 = f(r 0 r ?1 ), which means we can nd a preimage of y by de nition of q-one-wayness. This in turn contradicts the assumption that G is one-way, if P is in polynomial time.
14 Next, we describe an unconditionally binding scheme: Commitment to integer 0 a < q: P chooses random r 2 H, and sends commit(r; a) = y a f(r) to V .
Hiding Property: follows immediately from the assumption in De nition 3.5.
Binding Property: De nition 3.5 guarantees that if V accepts the set-up phase, commitments to di erent values will be in distinct cosets of Im(f). It should be clear from the de nition of these commitments that both types have the additive homomorphism property required in our protocols: suppose we are given commitments to values a and b. Let j be such that a + b = (a + b) mod q + jq, and let t be such that f(t) = y jq . Note that by assumption, t is easy to compute. It then holds that commit(r; a) commit(s; b) = commit(rst; (a+ b) mod q). In a similar way, it follows that commit(r; a) c = commit(r 0 ; ca mod q) and y c commit(r; a) = commit(r 00 ; (c + a) mod q) for a constant c and easily computable values r 0 ; r 00 2 H.
Proofs for Bit Commitments and Multiplication
We now turn to the required protocol for showing that a commitment contains a 0/1 value. For this, it turns out to be su cient to be able to prove knowledge of a preimage under f. We have the following protocol, which can used for any f generated by a q-one-way generator, and is a generalization of Schnorr's discrete log protocol 22]: f-PREIMAGE PROTOCOL Input: f and u 2 G. P knows v, such that f(v) = u.
P chooses
2. V chooses a random number e, so that 0 e < q and sends it to P. 3. P sends z = rv e to V , who checks that f(z) = mu e . The properties of this protocol are the following: Lemma 3.6 If P; V follow the protocol, V always accepts. From two accepting conversations (m; e; z); (m; e 0 ; z 0 ), where e 6 = e 0 , one can e ciently compute v such that f(v) = u. Finally, the protocol is honest veri er zero-knowledge.
Proof The rst claim is trivial. The second follows directly from the de nition of q-one-wayness. Finally, conversations with the honest veri er are simulated by choosing at random e; z, computing m = f(z)u ?e and outputting (m; e; z). u t It is clear that this protocol can be used to show that a commitment C contains 0, by using u = C, and that it contains 1 by using u = Cy ?1 . We may now use the proof of partial knowledge technique from 10] to make a protocol in which P proves that C contains 0 or 1, without revealing which is the case. This involves running the protocol for 0 in parallel with the protocol for 1, but have V issue only one challenge s. Now P must answer challenges e 0 ; e 1 in the two parallel instances, such that e 0 + e 1 = s (for details, please refer to 10]).
The resulting protocol is referred to as a bit commitment proof. It is still honest veri er zero-knowledge, and is a proof of knowledge with error probability 1=q that P can open C as 0 or 1. Its communication complexity is 4l + log q bits. Suppose that for some protocol, we need error probability 2 ?k . For this, we will need to repeat the 0/1 protocol in parallel dk= log qe times, leading to a communication complexity of 4ldk= log qe + k bits.
The nal auxiliary protocol we need is a multiplication protocol, an interactive proof that commitments A; B; C contain a; b; c for which c = ab mod q. Assume P knows how to write the commitments in the form A = y a f(r); B = y b f(u); C = y abmodq f(s): Now observe that if we choose j such that ab = (ab) mod q + jq and set t = f ?1 (y ?jq )su ?a , then t is easily computable by P, and C = B a f(t): Conversely, assuming that you can open A and B to reveal a; b, knowledge of such a t implies you can open C to reveal ab mod q. 16 This leads to a protocol proving what we want: MULTIPLICATION PROTOCOL Input: f and commitments A; B; C. P knows a; r; t; b; u, such that A = y a f(r), C = B a f(t) and B = y b f(u).
The protocol proceeds by executing the following two 3-step protocols in parallel, using the same challenge e in both instances. The rst is intended to verify that A; C have the correct form, while the second veri es that the prover can open B:
1. First protocol: Proof Easy modi cation of the proof of Lemma 3.6.
u t
The communication complexity of the multiplication protocol is 6l+3 log q bits. Suppose that for the main protocol, we need error probability 2 ?k . For this, we will repeat it in parallel dk= log qe times.
4 Results for the Main Protocols
In this section we state, without proof, the results we obtain for our main protocols when using the commitment schemes from the previous section. The results are restated and proved in Appendix B.
For formal de nitions of proof systems, completeness, soundness and zeroknowledge, please refer to 17]. In the case of arguments, completeness and zero-knowledge are as for proof systems, but for soundness, we treat the error probability in a way similar to the soundness error of proofs of knowledge as de ned by Bellare and Goldreich 3]: we will show that if a cheating prover can convince the veri er with probability > 2 ?k , then he can break the bit commitment scheme in expected time polynomial in l and 1=( ? 2 ?k ).
We remark that all our communication complexity results are computed without including the complexity of setting up the commitment schemes (Step 0 in the protocol descriptions). This is of course motivated by the fact that the same commitment scheme instance can be reused in many protocol executions. However, there are several cases, where including the setup step would make no di erence. This is true in general for Theorem 4.3, and for Theorems 4.4, 4.6 when based on the Di e-Hellman generator described later.
The general strategy for proving the results for our protocols is the following: we rst show directly that the main protocols as described earlier are honest veri er zero-knowledge. We cannot get zero-knowledge in general using standard resettable simulation since the prover must in all our protocols answer a challenge consisting of many bits. For arguments, this is solved by having the veri er prove initially knowledge of a trapdoor for the commitment scheme; the simulator can extract the trapdoor, and then simulate easily. For interactive proofs, we use the technique of having the veri er commit to his challenge in advance. This allows simulation as shown by Goldreich and Kahan 14] 4.1 Results for Non-Interactive SAT Protocols with Preprocessing Lemma 4.1 The protocol in Subsection 2.3 using commitments constructed from an unconditionally hiding q-homomorphism generator with unbounded q is a perfect honest veri er zero-knowledge argument with preprocessing for Boolean Circuit Satis ability. The communication complexity of the preprocessing is O(nl+k) bits, while the proof phase has size O(n + l). If the generator has bounded q, the conclusion is the same, except that the communication complexity of the prepro-cessing is O(n)max(k; l) bits. Before we give the corresponding result for unconditionally binding generators, we note that an unconditionally binding generator cannot have unbounded q, because it leads to l-bit commitments from which the contents is uniquely determined, and so we must have at least that q < 2 l . Lemma 4.2 The protocol in Subsection 2.3 using commitments constructed from an unconditionally binding q-homomorphism generator (with bounded q) is a computational honest veri er zero-knowledge proof with preprocessing for Boolean Circuit Satis ability. Communication complexity of the preprocessing is O(n)max(k; l) bits, while the proof phase has size O(n + l).
It now only remains to modify these protocols to be zero-knowledge in general, of course without loosing e ciency. We obtain the following: 
Results for Arithmetic Circuit Protocols
Recall that the protocols in Section 2.2 were de ned for an n-bit prime q, error probability 2 ?k , and a circuit with m inputs and t multiplication gates.
Lemma 4.5 The protocol in Subsection 2.2 using commitments constructed from an unconditionally hiding q-homomorphism generator is a perfect honest veri er zero-knowledge argument for the arithmetic circuit problem. When using commitments constructed from an unconditionally binding q-homomorphism generator we obtain an honest veri er computationally zero-knowledge proof. The communication complexity is O((m + t)(l + n)dk=ne) bits in either case. for the QBF problem with the same asymptotic round and communication complexity as Shen's interactive proof system when designed to have error probability 2 ?n for a length n QBF instance.
Proof sketch
The zero-knowledge protocol described in Subsection 2.5 consists of rst a stage where the prover and veri er go through "the same" interaction as in the original proof system, except that the prover sends commitments to his messages. Then a stage, where the prover convinces the veri er that a set of relations hold between the committed values. This stage is only honest veri er zero-knowledge as described in Section 2.5, but can be made zero-knowledge with no essential loss of e ciency in the same way as in the proof of Theorem 4.4, using the method from 14].
Having said this, the proof that our modi ed protocol is a zero-knowledge proof system for QBF is a straightforward modi cation of the proof from 6] that everything in IP has a zero-knowledge proof system if one-way functions exist. Speci cally, note the following: Like ours, the protocol built in 6] is a modi cation of an Arthur-Merlin interactive proof system with one-sided error (the honest prover always convinces the veri er). The transformation from 6] results in a two-stage protocol of the same form as ours. And nally, 6] assumes that the prover encrypts his messages using polynomially secure probabilistic encryption. This corresponds to the hiding property of our commitments. u t
Examples of Group Homomorphisms
Recall that any of our generators have 1 l and a prime q as parameters. Generators with bounded q include as part of their de nition a constant . Proof If q > N, it must be prime to (N), whence f is surjective. Hence deciding membership of some y in Im(f) only consists of verifying the q is a prime and that (y; N) = 1. Otherwise, a zero-knowledge proof must be provided that y is a qth power modulo N.
The generator is clearly one-way under the usual RSA assumption.
The only other requirement that is not completely trivial is q-one-wayness: assume we have z; y; i such that y i = z q mod N. Since 1 i < q, i is prime to q, so take ; such that i + q = 1. We claim that x = z y is the preimage of y we are looking for:
f(x) = z q y q = y i cot y q = y mod N u t One can also base an unconditionally binding generator on an RSA-like function. The resulting commitment/encryption scheme was rst discovered by Benaloh 7] in the context of veri able secret sharing. q-RESIDUOSITY GENERATOR The generator selects an RSA modulus N = p 1 p 2 of bit length l, for primes p 1 ; p 2 , subject to qj(p 1 ? 1)(p 2 ? 1) and = log q= log N. The output is N.
For this generator, we de ne H = G = Z N , and f(x) = x q mod N. By the q'th residusity assumption, we mean the assumption that random elements in distinct cosets of Im(f) as de ned here are polynomially indistinguishable. This is a natural generalization of the well known quadratic residuosity assumption. Lemma 5.2 Under the q'th residuosity assumption, the q-residuosity generator is an unconditionally binding q-homomorphism generator.
Proof The proof of q-one-wayness is the same as for the RSA generator (note that our assumption in particular implies that f is one-way). The element y that is required to exist in De nition 3.5 can be chosen as any element not in Im(f). u t
Di e-Hellman and Discrete Log Based One-Way Homomorphisms
We rst give a generator based on the discrete log problem modulo a prime number. The commitment scheme resulting from this generator was rst discovered by Pedersen 21] in the context of veri able secret sharing. DISCRETE LOG GENERATOR The generator selects randomly a prime p of bit length l, subject to = log q= log p and qjp ? 1, where 0 < < 1 is a constant. It also selects g 2 Z p , such that g generates the (unique) subgroup in Z p of order q. The output is p; g.
For this generator, we de ne H = Z q ; G =< g >, and f(x) = g x mod p. When using this generator as basis for our protocols, we will assume that a party receiving an element u supposedly in G always veri es that u q = 1 and stops the protocol if not. Lemma 5.3 Assume that any probabilistic polynomial time algorithm solves the discrete log problem modulo prime numbers as selected by the Discrete Log Generator with superpolynomially small probability. Then the Discrete Log Generator is an unconditionally hiding q-homomorphism generator with bounded q.
Proof It is clear that deciding membership of y in Im(f) amounts to verifying that p; q are primes, that qjp ? 1 and that g q = y q = 1 mod p. Inverting f is exactly the discrete log problem, which we assumed hard. Finally, for q-onewayness, from y i = g z mod p, we obtain y = g z i ?1 modq mod p = f(z i ?1 mod q) which is possible since i < q and so prime to q. u t
We remark that nothing prevents us from using other groups of prime order, such as for example the group on an appropriately chosen elliptic curve. 22
Finally, we show an example of an unconditionally binding generator, based on the Di e-Hellman problem 11]: DIFFIE-HELLMAN GENERATOR The generator selects randomly a prime p of bit length l=2, subject to = log q=l and qjp ? 1, where 0 < < 1=2 is a constant. It also selects g 2 Z p , such that g generates the (unique) subgroup in Z p of order q, and nally a random h 2< g >.
The output is p; g; h.
For this generator, we de ne H = Z q ; G =< g > < g >, and f(x) = (g x mod p; h x mod p) 5 .
Recall that (p; q; g; h) can be used as a public key to encrypt an element m 2< g > by choosing r at random and letting the ciphertext be (g r mod p; mh r mod p) 12]. We will call this Di e-Hellman encryption. Recall also the notion of polynomial security, de ned by Goldwasser and Micali 15], which says that random encryptions of distinct messages are poynomially indistinguishable. Clearly, Di e-Hellman cannot be polynomially secure, unless x ! g x mod p is hard to invert, and f is easily seen to be as hard to invert as this mapping. q-one-wayness follows in the same way as for the discrete log generator.
u t less favorable, we outline this approach based on span programs, since we believe that future improvements on the communication complexities might very well proceed along these lines. Let C be the Boolean circuit to be proved satis able. Our goal is to nd an e cient span program M C , i.e. one with a \small" number of rows and columns, such that the Boolean function computed by it is satis able if and only if C is 6 (please refer to 20] for de nitions concerning span programs). To this end, it is su cient to pass rst to a Boolean formula C that is satisable if and only if C is: it is quite straightforward to construct a span-program computing the same function as a given Boolean formula (inductive argument). Moreover, this construction yields a span program with at most O(m) rows and columns, where m is the size of the formula.
To faciliate construction of our protocol based on span programs and our commitment schemes, some further properties are very useful.
If we pass from C to Phi by taking it as the conjunction over the jCj formulas that check the computation of C at each gate, and derive the span program from this particular formula , it turns out that the matrix that de nes the span program can be chosen as a 0/1-matrix and that the coe cients in a linear combination of the rows leading to the root of the span program can be selected from the set f?1; 0; 1g, regardless the underlying eld we have chosen for the span program. Finally, we note that the columns of the span program thus obtained have constant Hamming weight.
With M C constructed from C as outlined above, to show that C is satis able it is su cient to show that there exists a suitable linear combination of the rows leading to the root of the span program. There is a direct correspondence between a satisfying assignment of C and the coe cients of that linear combination.
Without giving any further details here, we state that even if those coe cients are committed to by means of a commitment scheme as de ned in Section 2.1, it is still possible to perform the necessary linear algebraic operations on the coe cients hidden in the commitments and to show, non-interactively and in zero knowledge, the satis ability of the span program and hence that of C. The pre-processing phase is similar to the one from Section 2.3.
We nally note that nding an even more e cient span program M C that is satis able if and only if C, would probably yield even more e cient noninteractive zero knowledge proofs for SAT with preprocessing.
B Results With Proofs for the Main Protocols
In this section we restate and prove the results we obtain for our main protocols when using the commitment schemes we have presented.
We remark that all our communication complexity results are computed without including the complexity of setting up the commitment schemes (Step 0 in the protocol descriptions). This is of course motivated by the fact that the same commitment scheme instance can be reused in many protocol executions. However, there are several cases, where including the setup step would make no di erence. This is true in general for Theorem B. Proof First recall that completeness and communcation complexity was established already in Lemma 2.3, except for the complexity (n; k; l) of doing the bit commitment proofs in the preprocessing. For the unbounded q case, we will choose q = max(2 k ; 2 2n ). For the bounded q case, we have q = 2 l for a constant > 0. In both cases the communication complexities now follow directly from the remarks on the f-preimage protocol, if one also observes that all the required bit commitment proofs can be done in parallel, using the same k-bit challenge for all of them.
For soundness, assume that some polynomial time P can get V to accept a circuit with probability > 2 ?k . We will build from this an algorithm Alg which in expected time polynomial in 1=( ? 2 ?k ) and l nds either a satisfying assignment, or breaks a given instance of the commitment scheme. This is clearly enough for soundness as de ned above.
Alg starts by sending the public key of the bit commitment scheme to P . It then simulates the proof that y 2 Im(f), with P acting as the veri er. Then Alg issues random challenges for the bit commitment proofs, rewinding P after each challenge has been answered. When correct answers to two di erent challenges have been obtained, by Lemma 3.6, we will know how to open all commitments issued. We may assume that all NAND-tables produced are correct, since otherwise the proofs of correctness will give a way to open at least one commitment in a new way. The proof in Step 3 establishes equality of bits in a set of pairs of commitments selected from the T i 's by multiplying together two sets of commitments and opening the quotient as 0. Given the group element revealed in this opening, if one can open one product, one can compute a way to open the other one to reveal the same value. But since we already know how to open all commitments in the T i 's, we know a priori how to open both products, and hence if they do not in fact contain the same value, we can break the commitment scheme.
It now follows that the rows selected in the T i 's represent a consistent computation in the circuit, and since the output is 1, by the opening in Step 4 of the proof, we have a satisfying assignment.
Finally, honest veri er zero-knowledge is easy, since the simulator can use the proof of knowledge given by V in the setup phase to extract a preimage under f of y. This will always succeed if V is honest. Given such a preimage, the simulator can open any commitment any way it wants, and the simulation becomes trivial. u t Before we give the corresponding result for unconditionally binding generators, we note that an unconditionally binding generator cannot have unbounded q, because it leads to l-bit commitments from which the contents is uniquely determined, and so we must have at least that q < 2 l .
Lemma B.2 The protocol in Subsection 2.3 using commitments constructed from an unconditionally binding q-homomorphism generator (with bounded q) is a computational honest veri er zero-knowledge proof with preprocessing for Boolean Circuit Satis ability. Communication complexity of the preprocessing is O(n)max(k; l) bits, while the proof phase has size O(n + l). 28
Proof The proof of soundness is essentially the same as for the previous lemma.
The only di erence is that it is enough to observe that if > 2 ?k , there exists good answers to two di erent challenges, and so all commitments must contain 0/1 values. Furthermore, the cases where a commitment can be opened in di erent ways simply cannot occur, and so we always nd a satisfying assignment. We then consider honest veri er zero-knowledge: the simulator executes the setup phase for the commitment scheme according to the protocol. It then constructs all the NAND tables for the preprocessing according to the protocol, except that T n is constructed such that its third column contains commitments to 1's only. The proofs of correctness of AND-tables are simulated by invoking the honest veri er simulators for the bit-commitment proof and the multiplication protocol a su cient number of times.
The simulator now chooses an arbitrary set of input bits for the circuit, and does Steps 2 and 3 of the proof according to the protocol.
Step 4 is also executed according to the protocol, which is easy by construction of T n .
The bit commitment proof simulation is sometimes invoked on commitments that are not bit commitments (when we "prove" correctness of the NAND-table used for T n ). But by the hiding property, these commitments have distributions that are polynomially indistinguishable from good values. It follows that the honest veri er simulators we call as subrutines will produce conversations with distribution that is polynomially indistinguishable from the one produced on inputs that are bit commitments.
Finally, the numbers revealed to open various products of commitments have exactly the correct distribution, because this distribution depends only on the form of the expressions de ned in the protocol, not on the values in the commitments. u t It now only remains to modify these protocols to be zero-knowledge in general, of course without loosing e ciency. We obtain the following: Theorem B.3 If there exists an unconditionally hiding q-homomorphism generator with unbounded q then there exists a non-interactive perfect zero-knowledge argument with preprocessing for Boolean Formula Satis ability. The communication complexity of the preprocessing is O(nl + k) bits, while the proof phase has size O(n + l). If the generator has bounded q, the conclusion is the same, but the communication complexity of the preprocessing becomes O(n)max(k; l) bits.
Proof It turns out that the protocol guaranteed by Lemma B.1 can be used here without modi cation, we only have to require that the proof of knowledge of an f-preimage of y given by V in the setup phase is iterated 2n times so that its error probability is 2 ?2n (recall that we are using the f-preimage protocol with a 1-bit challenge in each iteration).
With this requirement, we can simulate against an arbitrary V as follows: we rst execute the setup phase according to the protocol. If V gives incorrect answers, we stop and quit (as P would have done). Otherwise, we check if V could in any iteration answer also the question we did not ask him in the rst run. This is easy to do with rewinding. If yes, we compute a preimage of y, and can trivially simulate the rest of the protocol. If no, we do an exhaustive search for a satisfying assignment (we are only required to simulate if one exists) and do the rest of the protocol by following the prover's algorithm. This clearly produces a correct output distribution. The expected running time is polynomial, since the probability with which we do the exhaustive search is at most 2 ?2n , and in the search, we need to check at most 2 2n possible assigments: since we have at most n binary gates, there can be no more than 2n di erent input bits.
This establishes zero-knowledge. Soundness and asymptotic communication complexity are the same as in Lemma B.1. Proof We will use the protocol guaranteed by Lemma B.2 together with the technique of Goldreich and Kahan 14] , where the veri er commits to his challenge before the prover sends the rst message. If an unconditionally hiding commitment scheme is used, P gets no information on V 's challenge ahead of time, and hence the soundness is not a ected. On the other hand, simulation becomes possible, because the simulator can rst get the veri er to open his commitment, and then invoke the honest veri er simulator using the fact that the challenge is now known ahead of time. For a solution of the subtle technical problems with this, see 14] .
To establish the required commitment scheme (with V as the committer), notice that we already assume that we have a q-one-way generator, so in the set-up phase, the prover can, once and for all, publish a y 0 2 Im(f) (in addition to the y 6 2 Im(f)). By the way we choose q in Lemma B.2, this allows V to commit to any l-bit value. If k is larger than this, more commitments must be used. An easy calculation shows that this adds O(max(k; l)) bits to the complexity, so the asymptotic behavior stays the same as in Lemma B.2. u t
B.2 Results for Arithmetic Circuit Protocols
Lemma B.5 The protocol in Subsection 2.2 using commitments constructed from an unconditionally hiding q-homomorphism generator is a perfect honest veri er zero-knowledge argument for the arithmetic circuit problem. When using commitments constructed from an unconditionally binding q-homomorphism generator we obtain an honest veri er computationally zero-knowledge proof. The communication complexity is O((m + t)(l + n)dk=ne) bits in either case.
Proof The communication complexity follows from Lemma 2.1 and the remarks following Lemma 3.7.
We then rst handle the case of using an unconditionally hiding generator: For soundness, assume that some polynomial time P can get V to accept a circuit and output value y with probability > 2 ?k . We will build from this an algorithm Alg which in expected time polynomial in 1=( ? 2 ?k ) and l nds either a assignment to the inputs that lead to output y, or breaks the commitment scheme. This is clearly enough for soundness as de ned above.
Alg starts by sending the public key of the bit commitment scheme to P .
It then a zero-knowledge proof that y 2 Im(f), with P acting as the veri er.
Then Alg issues random challenges for the multiplication proofs and the proofs of knowledge of contents for I 1 ; ::; I m ; T 1 ; :::; T t , rewinding P after each challenge has been answered. When correct answers to two di erent challenges have been obtained, by Lemma 3.7, we know how to open all involved commitments. If the input values in I 1 ; :::; I m that we know lead to input values to a multiplication gate that are not consistent with the values we know from the multiplication protocol, we can break the commitment scheme. If not, the input values we have found do in fact lead to y as output from . Honest veri er zero-knowledge is easy, since the simulator can use the proof of knowledge given by V in the setup phase to extract a preimage under f of y. This will always succeed if V is honest. Given such a preimage, the simulator can open any commitment any way it wants, and the simulation becomes trivial. Now to the case of using an unconditionally binding generator:
Soundness can be argued in the same way as above, except that it is enough to observe that if > 2 ?k , there exists good answers to two di erent challenges, and so all multiplication gates must have correctly related input/output values assigned. Furthermore, the cases where a commitment can be opened in di erent ways simply cannot occur, and so we always nd a good set of input values.
For honest veri er zero-knowledge, note that is a natural way de nes a linear mapping from GF(q) m+t to GF(q), where one starts by the inputs to plus the outputs from all multiplications and use the linear operations in to compute the output. If the provers claim that may produce y is true, then y must be in the image of this mapping. It follows that the simulator can, by solving a linear system of equations, compute values to put in the I 1 ; :::; I m ; T 1 ; :::; T t that will lead to a commitment containing y when the veri er computes the commitment representing the output value. So the simulator constructs the commitments this way. All that remains now is to invoke the honest veri er simulators for multiplication proofs and proofs of contents an appropriate number of times, and open the output commitment to reveal y.
For correctness of the output distribution, note that values in commitments assigned to multiplication gates may not have the multiplicative relation they always obey in real conversations. But by the hiding property, the commitments to these values are polynomially indistinguishable from commitments to correct values. It follows that the (polynomial-time) honest veri er simulator we call as subrutine, produces from such commitments conversations that are polynomially indistinguishable from real conversations. Hence we get computational zero-knowledge. erator (with bounded q), then there exists a zero-knowledge interactive proof system for the QBF problem with the same asymptotic round and communication complexity as Shen's interactive proof system when designed to have error probability 2 ?n for a length n QBF instance.
Proof sketch
